15-PASSENGER VAN LITIGATION
The automobile industry has grave problems with 15-passenger vans. They were involved in 1,281 fatal crashes from 1990 through 2000. 424 deaths resulted from 268 single-vehicle rollover crashes. NHTSA has found that in fatal single-vehicle crashes, vans with 10 or more occupants rolled over 85 percent of the time compared with only 38 percent of the time in vans with fewer then 10 occupants. This number drops to a rollover of only 28 percent of the time when the van has fewer then five occupants.
The dangers of 15-passenger vans first made the headlines on April 9, 2001, when the NHTSA issued a Consumer Advisory warning users of 15-passenger vans of an increased rollover risk under certain conditions. The Consumer Advisory pointed out the fact that 15-passenger vans with 10 or more occupants had a rollover rate in single vehicle crashes that is nearly 3 times the rate of vans that were lightly loaded. NHTSA’s analysis found that loading the 15-passenger van causes the center of gravity to shift rearward and upward increasing the likelihood of rollover. The shift in the center of gravity also increases the potential for loss of control and panic maneuvers.
NHTSA published “The Rollover Propensity of Fifteen-Passenger Vans” by W. Riley Garrott in April 2001. Dr. Garrott performed a study of:
1. 
Crash data;
2. Measurement of static stability factors; and
3. Simulation analysis of the handling characteristics.
Their crash data information found that the 15-passenger vans have a propensity to roll over which increases depending upon the occupancy level. They found that a 15-passenger van has six times the risk of rolling over as compared to a 15-passenger van that has less than five occupants.
They also measured the static stability factors for lightly loaded and compared them to fully loaded 15-passenger vans. They found that the vans experienced a static stability reduction of anywhere from a 3% to 11% change depending upon the vehicle. Below is a copy of graphs prepared from their report.
The report also found that when the 15-passenger van is fully loaded, it has over 65% of its weight on the rear axle. The 7-passenger vans and mini-vans have approximately 50% of their weight on their rear axles when fully loaded. This has an adverse effect on the handling of 15-passenger vans. This was proven by computer simulation runs that were performed by NHTSA. The simulations show that the fully loaded vans have a transition toward oversteer at forces above .4g lateral acceleration.
They found that the vehicle’s understeer characteristics are similar to its lightly loaded condition at low level accelerations but it differs at high lateral accelerations. This type of transition is known in the safety community to cause problems for drivers who normally drive smaller passenger vehicles and who are unfamiliar with a loaded 15-passenger van’s responsiveness and limits.
Fifteen passenger vans again made the headlines when the NTSB addressed a Safety Recommendation directly to William Clay Ford and Richard Wagner, Chief Executive Officers of Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation, respectively. This Safety Recommendation informed Ford and GM of their problems with the 15-passenger vans based on the data contained in the NTSB’s safety report titled “Evaluation of the Rollover Propensity of 15-Passenger Vans” adopted on October 15, 2002. The NTSB’s Safety Recommendation asks the manufacturers to evaluate technological systems that could assist drivers in maintaining control of 15-passenger vans. G.M. announced in October 2003 that they were adding these features to their vans. Ford has indicated that they are also adding it to their Econoline series but they have not made a public announcement.
James Vondale, who is the Director of Ford’s Automotive Safety Office, testified that despite the fact that the National Transportation Safety Board addressed this Safety Recommendation directly to William Clay Ford, he has had no communication with Mr. Ford regarding any of the Safety Recommendations issued by the NTSB. In fact, he did not know if Mr. William Ford had any knowledge of the United States’ government’s interest in the safety of 15-passenger vans since he had never sent him any memos, letters or e-mails to him to notify him about these safety recommendations. Brewer v. Ford Motor Company, et al. St. Francis County, AR CIV 2001-312Y, Vondale Depo. pp. 53-55)
Shortly after these warnings were issued by NHTSA and the NTSB, Dodge got out of the 15-passenger van market all together. No one has been able to get Dodge to confirm that the reason they stopped manufacturing the 15-passenger vans is because they are defectively designed and their costs of litigation were rising.
Ford Motor Company has encountered a plethora of problems in 15-passenger van litigation. The first problem is that their test documents from the Corporate Engineering Test Procedure, commonly known as P6-101 Testing, have either been lost or destroyed. Ford has to admit at every deposition that they cannot find these documents which were generated by their engineers as they were developing the 15-passenger van. These documents required the engineers to rate the vehicle on a 1-10 rating scale prior to Ford “signing off” on producing the vans.
Ford retained Lee Carr to replicate the P6-101 testing in 1998 in an attempt to solve this problem. Mr. Carr had a couple of the test drivers who worked on the development of the E-350 drive the vehicle. Of course their test results under Mr. Carr’s supervision reflect no problems. What else would one expect when Ford pays Lee Carr $895 per hour for this “service?”
Ford’s biggest blunder came on February 14, 2003, when James Lowe and Dennis Mullvihill presented unrefuted evidence in Johnson v. Ford, U.S.D.C., Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division; No. 99C0509; before the Honorable Robert Gettleman that Ford intentionally lied and hid two damning pieces of evidence. First, Ford Engineer, Donald Thrasher, had testified in multiple cases that during the P6-101 testing, no 15-passenger van had ever rolled over. He even added the comment that Ford vehicles just don’t roll over. However, Richard Schettler testified on January 22, 2003 in Rhonda F. Baker v. Ford Motor Co. Liberty County, GA, 01-SV-5869 that he rolled over a 15-passenger van during P6-101 testing while Mr. Thrasher was present. In fact, Mr. Thrasher gave him suggestions on how to drive the van in light of its roll over. Even though David Wotton and others have testified that they have never heard of a Ford test driver rolling over a Ford vehicle before, no one made a written report about the fact that Richard Schettler experienced a roll over while test driving an E-350, 15-passenger van.
The second issue presented to the Court was the fact that Ford had ADAMS modeling on this 15-passenger van and failed to turn it over. Ford denied its very existence. However, Ford used ADAMS modeling information in an attempt to rebut NHTSA’s April 2001 report then denied its existence in discovery after April 2001. Ford argued in vain that it was an incomplete box on wheels that was not responsive to the Plaintiff’s discovery request. However, it was good enough for them to use it to respond to NHTSA’s Consumer Advisory. Thomas Wielenga; Ph.D. of Engineering Insight is an expert for the plaintiffs in several E-350 cases. Dr. Wielenga has analyzed the data from the modeling that Ford gave to NHTSA and determined that the 15-passenger van experienced one rollover and two-wheel lift on two other occasions.
Judge Gettleman severely criticized Ford for concealing this evidence.
“I’ve rejected Ford’s position that this was some innocent mistake . . . and I don’t want to believe lawyers would come and risk their licenses and livelihoods and professional reputations by making false statements to a Court, but that is what is happening. Whether they’re being set up by their client, you know, it’s a big company, and maybe they can that sort of thing and hope they get away with it, but what happened here it appears to me is that the plaintiffs either serendipitously [sic] or through great coordination among each other in separate cases got together and put the pieces of the puzzle together and the picture that they paint is a very disturbing one and a very serious one. It almost borders on criminal to be honest with you. Somebody is lying here. Somebody is committing perjury it appears to me, or at least maybe committing perjury . . . It’s breathtaking. It is literally breathtaking.”
Alternative designs
Many plaintiffs are putting forward “dual rear wheels” as an alternative design solution to solving the rollover propensity of 15-passenger vans. Lee Carr, who is Ford’s expert, testified that dual rear wheels are only needed on vehicles that carry a load of 9,300 pounds and above. Since the 15-passenger vans have a gross vehicle weight rating of 9,100 pounds, they are 200 pounds short of requiring dual rear wheels. However, he cannot point to any underlying data or reasons for not having the dual rear wheels on vehicles carrying 9,100 pounds or less.
Under the category “can you believe he really said this,” David Wotton and Lee Carr testified that the reason that dual rear wheels would not work on the 15-passenger vans because that would prevent them from going through a car wash. Therefore, consumers would be inconvenienced by being unable to the 15-passenger through a car wash and would cease to use them! Ask your jury which is more important: a clean van or a safe van?
The Kentucky Court of Appeals recently affirmed a jury verdict against Ford in the amount of approximately 20 million dollars. The case is Ford Motor Co. v. Coulson, 2003 WL 212 04671 (Ky. App.). This decision was handed down on May 23, 2003. It involved a rollover that occurred after a vehicle passed a van and struck it at least one time. Ford argued in the appeal that a test run of a sample Ford van conducted by plaintiff’s expert Robert Hooker was improperly admitted into evidence because the test failed to replicate the condition of the accident. The plaintiffs argue that since the Hooker test was not offered for the purpose of re-creating the accident and the jury was told that it was not a recreation, there was no harm in allowing the out-of-court experiment. The purpose of the out-of-court experiment was to indicate to the jury how the vehicle performs from a rollover/stability standpoint in various known and accepted driving maneuvers and techniques. As such, the Hooker tests were properly admitted.
On August 4, 2003, the NTSB issued more Safety Recommendations for the 15-passenger vans. This time, the Safety Recommendations were also sent to the Governors of all states requesting that the General Assembly of each state change the license requirements for persons to operate 15-passenger vehicles. A full copy of these safety recommendations can be found at the NTSB’s web page.
Insurance companies are refusing to issue liability coverage to owners of 15-passenger vans. GuideOne insures many churches and either refuses to insure the churches or limits the drivers to certain individuals who have received special training in how to operate a 15-passenger van. Jan Beckstrom, the Chief Operating Officer of GuideOne, labeled 15-passenger vans “inherently dangerous.” GuideOne has urged its customers to use small buses as safer modes of transportation.
CONCLUSION
The litigation arising from 15-passenger van rollovers is providing justice for our respective clients and society as a whole. As a result of this litigation, Ford and General Motors are in the process of changing the design of these vehicles so that they can be more controllable. Although they are not adding the dual rear wheels as a solution, they are on the process of adding electronic controls to assist drivers when they are in emergency situations. The work that outstanding trial lawyers across the country have done in litigating these cases, has paved the way for attorneys such as myself to aid our clients and to cause the automobile industry to manufacture a safer vehicle.
